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FROM MOTHERS' ALLOWANCE TO
MOTHERS NEED NOT APPLY:
CANADIAN WELFARE LAW AS
LIBERAL AND NEO-LIBERAL
REFORMS©
SHELLEY A.M. GAVIGAN* & DOROTHY E. CHUNN**
In this paper we examine changes in the form
and content of Canadian welfare law through a
historical, feminist lens using the exemplar of motherheaded families. Our analysis of how the state dealt
with sole support mothers in several provinces
throughout the twentieth century reveals important
continuities, as well as discontinuities, between the
past and the present that have shaped and reshaped
the lives and experiences of poor women and their
children. In doing so, it helps to illuminate how they
have been rendered "undeserving" or "never
deserving" with the neo-liberal (re)formation of the
Keynesian state in Canada.

Dans le pr6sent article nous examinons les
modifications dans la forme et dans le contenu de la
16gislation sociale canadienne scion une perspective
historique et f6ministe qui recourt 5 l'exemple des
families dirig6es par la mere. Notre analyse de la
manire dont IEtat a abord6 le probl~me des mres
qui sont l'unique soutien de leur famille dans plusieurs
provinces tout au long du XXe si~cle, r6v~le
d'importantes continuit6s et dgalement discontinuit6s
entre le pass6 et le present qui ont fagonn et
remodel6 les vies et les exp6riences des femmes
pauvres et de leurs enfants; cette analyse contribue
ainsi A mettre en lumi~re la mani~re dont ces femmes
ont 6 rendues -,non m6ritantes-, voire ,jamais
m6ritantes dans le cadre de la formation (et de la
r6forme) d'un Etat n6o-lib6ral keyn6sien au Canada.
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"The origins of income security in Ontario begin with motherhood."'
"[Tlhe beauty of the system [Chicago's Court of Domestic Relations in 19201, from the
perspective of its officials, was that all of that money came from delinquent husbands- 2
not the public coffers."
"The parenting needs of the children of sole mothers appear singularly unaddressed in3
the welfare reform debate."

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Canada, as elsewhere, extensive welfare law and policy
reforms that effectively erased the category of "deserving poor" marked
the neo-liberal (re)formation of the Keynesian state during the late
twentieth century. In this article, we examine the contemporary changes
in the form and content of Canadian welfare law through a historical,
feminist lens using the exemplar of mother-headed families. Although
public spending on the poor has always been grudging, within the
dominant discourses of welfare sole-support mothers were historically
considered to be among the most deserving recipients of public
assistance. Therefore, an analysis of how they have been rendered
"undeserving" or "never deserving" can help illuminate the profound
changes that occurred in Canada and other jurisdictions since the 1970s
with the ascendancy of neo-liberalism.

James Struthers, The Limits of Affluence: Welfare in Ontario, 1920-1970 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1994) at 19.
2 Michael Willrich, "Home Slackers: Men, the State, and Welfare in Modern America"
(2000) 87 J. Am. Hist. 460 at 486 [Willrich, "Home Slackers"]. See also Michael Willrich, City of
Courts: Socializing Justice in Progressive Era Chicago (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003) [Willrich, City of Courts].
' Maggie Walter, "Working Their Way Out of Poverty? Sole Motherhood, Poverty,
Welfare and Material Well-Being" (2002) 38 J. Sociology 361 at 377.

2007]

Mothers Need Not Apply

Our point of departure is the burgeoning extant literature
centred on discrete substantive and theoretical concerns related to
women and welfare. We draw liberally on a large body of feminist
historical work that traces the socio-legal roots and administration of
mothers' allowances or pensions in five Canadian provinces during the
first half of the twentieth century. This research tells us much about the
development of pre-Keynesian state formation in Canada. In the
contemporary context, we begin with the use of history and historiography
in feminist analytical work on women, welfare, and neo-liberalism. Our
primary focus is on the social policy and welfare reform in Ontario in the
mid-1990s, which was arguably the most dramatic in the Canadian
context. This was achieved through a restructuring of welfare law,
reduction of rates, rejection of long-term need based on reasons of
parental responsibility, and redefinition of welfare (as fraud).4 In these
ways, the provincial Conservative government's legislation heralded a
major break from some of the historic premises of and rationales for
social assistance. Of particular relevance to our analysis is the
theoretical work premised upon assertions of a shift from the past to the
present, expressed, for instance, as "a shift from public responsibility to
private self-reliance, from social welfare rights to individualized support
obligations."5
Feminists who write about women (or mothers) and welfare
have tended to conceptualize the issues in an either/or manner. They
look at women in the family or women in the market; they focus on
history or history of the here and now; they examine the discursive
change or the structural change. These bifurcated forms of framing
arguably distort important issues in two ways that we attempt to avoid in
our analysis.

4 Ontario Works Act, 1997 S.O. 1997, c. 25, Sch. A [Ontario Works Act].

I Brenda Cossman, "Family Feuds: Neo-Liberal and Neo-Conservative Visions of the
Reprivatization Project" in Brenda Cossman & Judy Fudge, eds., Privatization,Law, and the
Challenge to Feminism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) 169 at 170-71. Cossman
observes the following:
...
the privatization of the costs of social reproduction is hardly a new phenomenon in Canada. Family
law and social welfare law have long been implicated in constituting a familial ideology that casts
women's economic dependency as naturally located within the realm of the nuclear family ... [but]...
there is something distinctive about the current phase of privatization[:] ...Through the dual
strategies of reprivatization and familialization, once-public goods and services are being
reconstituted as naturally located within the realm of the family.
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First, they implicitly accept the dominant construction of welfare
as policy that relates only to poor people. This acceptance has the
unintended consequence of obscuring the fact that those once
characterized by David Lewis as "corporate welfare bums"6 have also
fared well by Canadian social and economic policies, enjoying all
manner of incentives, land grants, favourable tariff policies, tax
incentives, tax breaks, and so on.' So, while our article is devoted
primarily to the emergence, development, and transformation of the
way in which welfare and state support have been structured in relation
to poor mothers in Canada, we resist the construction of the poor as the
only recipients or beneficiaries of "state welfare."
Second, we attempt to avoid the other pitfall of an either/or"that was then, this is now"-approach to women and welfare that
neglects the important historical continuities by which welfare for the
poor has been defined and administered. We therefore identify and
attend to continuities as well as discontinuities in Canadian social policy,
both in history and in the present.
There are some striking continuities between the first wave of
mothers' allowance legislation and the neo-liberal reforms of the 1990s.
Both periods were ones of structural change and reformation of the
relationships between the state, the market, and the family, including a
particular concern about the "crisis" of the (nuclear) family. However,
we also identify important discontinuities including the different forms
of liberal state (pre-Keynesian and post-Keynesian), as well as the
different forms of welfare law and policy in the two periods.
In particular, we analyze the larger structural contexts in which
welfare law and policy have been developed and reformed. Drawing on
feminist critiques that demonstrated the ideological nature of the
public/private divide, 8 we argue that the relationships between public
6 David Lewis, Louder Voices: The Corporate Welfare Bums (Toronto: James Lewis &
Samuel, 1972).
' See e.g. Elisabeth Wallace, "The Origin of the Welfare State in Canada 1867-1900"
(1950) 16 Can. J. Econ. & Pol. Sci. 383; Claire F.L. Young, Women, Tax, and Social Programs. The
GenderedImpact of FundingSocial Programs Through the Tax System (Ottawa: Status of Women
Canada, 2000); Harry Glasbeek, Wealth by Stealth: Corporate Crime, Corporate Law, and the
Perversion of Democracy (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2002). In the United States context, see
Mimi Abramovitz, "Everyone is Still on Welfare: The Role of Redistribution in Social Policy"
(2001) 46 Social Work 297.
' See e.g. Susan B. Boyd, ed., Challenging the Public/PrivateDivide: Feminism, Law and
PublicPolicy(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997); Frances E. Olsen, "The Family and the
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and private in liberal states have been reformed rather than
transformed. Specifically, we investigate two questions through an
analysis of official documents, law reform and policy initiatives, and case
law. First, given that most women have straddled the so-called
public/private divide, how have their relationships to state, market, and
family influenced the constructions of single mothers in Canadian
welfare law and policy? And second, to what extent do changes in legal
and other discourse, as well as changes in social and economic relations,
reflect and shape those constructions?
Our argument proceeds with the following four parts of the
article. In the next part, we examine the pre-Keynesian development of
welfare for single mothers and their children, and demonstrate the
longstanding relationship between women's labour (both paid and
unpaid) and mothers' allowances (welfare). We then provide an
overview of the constitutional and social policy context of liberal welfare
law reform in Canada during the transitional Keynesian moment,
illustrating the close connection that welfare reform has had with fiscal
policy, rather than social policy. In Part IV, we analyze the recent era of
neo-liberal welfare reform, which we argue is shaped by the principle that
"no mothers need apply," in which responsibility for children has been
rendered invisible (at best) and been relegated to no one (at worst). In
the concluding part, we synthesize welfare law reform "then and now"
and identify the continuities and discontinuities that have shaped and
reshaped the lives and experiences of poor women and their children.
II.

WOMEN AND WELFARE
FOUNDATIONS

THEN:

PRE-KEYNESIAN

Viewed retrospectively, welfare reforms that were implemented
from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century collectively
reformed the public/private divide (state/family/market), and
constructed the foundations of a pre-Keynesian state in Canada and
other jurisdictions. This reshaping of social legislation and policy

Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform" (1983) 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497; Judy Fudge, "The
Public/Private Distinction: The Possibilities of and the Limits to the Use of Charter Litigation"
(1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 485; Margaret Thornton, "The Public/Private Dichotomy: Gendered
and Discriminatory" (1991) 18 J.L. & Soc'y 448.
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occurred in the context of massive structural change marked by
industrialization, urbanization, and the establishment of universal
(white) suffrage during and after the First World War. While it is
important to bear in mind the unevenness of change both within and
across cultures Liberal states experienced a growing concentration of
people along class lines in specific urban areas that made the poor
(especially the racialized and immigrant poor) more visible, fuelling
middle class and elite fear of potential threats to social order. Apparent
increases in the number of "deviant" families-including sole-support
mothers and their children-at different times throughout the period
from the 1880s to the 1940s supported perceptions that the (nuclear)
family was in crisis and under siege.9 Conviction among the middle and
elite classes that the nuclear family was the means of achieving
integration and "social control" in mass society focused attention on the
role of mothers in the social reproduction of "good" citizens. ° Deviant
families had to be prevented if possible and rehabilitated if necessary.
To that end, reformers demanded forms of state intervention (for
instance fiscal, legal) to shore up nuclear family life in the community."
Two types of gendered welfare legislation and policy resulted
from these efforts. The first category included legislation aimed
primarily at male providers, incorporating laissez-faire conceptions of
the poor and of poverty as an individual responsibility, with a new
emphasis on the legal obligations of husbands and fathers to support
their dependants and the role of the state in enforcing these patriarchal
obligations. From the late nineteenth century on, legislation was enacted
in Canada to force husbands and fathers to support their wives and their
children. The new laws included Criminal Code provisions criminalizing
the failure to provide the necessaries of life, and a spate of provincial
legislation pertaining to the maintenance of deserted wives (later
9 Threats to "the family" emanated from various sources including the decline of the white,
middle-class, Anglo-Celtic birthrate; extensive non-Anglo-Celtic immigration; the death and
incapacitation caused by two world wars; epidemics and contagious diseases (e.g., post-First World War
influenza, tuberculosis, and venereal disease); and the impact of the economic collapse of the 1930s.
"aDorothy E. Chunn, From Punishment to Doing Good: Family Courts and Socialized
Justice in Ontario,1880-1940(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992); Jacques Donzelot, The
Policing of Families (New York: Pantheon, 1980); David Garland, Punishment and Welfare
(Brookfield, VT: Gower, 1985).
/ Chunn, ibid.; Ann Vandepol, "Dependent Children, Child Custody, and the Mothers'
Pensions: The Transformation of State-Family Relations in the Early 20th Century" (1982) 29
Social Problems 221.

2007]

MothersNeed Not Apply

deserted wives and children), children of unmarried parents, and
2
indigent parents.'
This legislation also placed an onus on individual women to
conform to the criteria historically associated with the "deserving poor."
Although male judges showed disdain for men who were "home
slackers,"' 3 they were also less than receptive to "undeserving" women.
As we outline and demonstrate more fully below, in order to be eligible
for assistance, a wife was required to have been abandoned and not
responsible for the separation, to be morally impeccable as a mother,
and to have made every effort to locate her absconding spouse prior to
seeking help from the courts. Simfiilarly, an unmarried mother, although
morally compromised, was expected to pursue the (putative) father of
her child(ren) for support. 4 However, women's notable lack of success
in obtaining support from their husbands and the fathers of their
children generated both internal and external pressure on the provinces
to help local governments to create and finance specialized tribunals to
deal with non-support.
The result was the establishment of domestic relations divisions
in the traditional criminal courts and new family courts to enforce family
welfare legislation. 5 Among other things, these socialized tribunals
helped "deserving" women track down deserting husbands and collected
support on their behalf. While many reformers advocated such tribunals
as a more humane and effective way to deal with problem families,
government bureaucrats and politicians were concerned primarily with
the monetary bottom line. This is to say that individual men, and not the
state, bore the primary responsibility for family maintenance.
Enforcement and collection always remained a problem, but that

12

Chunn, ibid. See also Willrich, "Home Slackers," supra note 2; Willrich, City of Courts,

supra note 2. Examples from the Canadian legal context include the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1927,
c.36, ss. 238, 239, 242 regarding the duty to provide necessaries (see especially the patriarchal
responsibility and liability imposed in s. 242(3)(a) on a man "as a husband or head of a family");
Married Women (Maintenance in Case of Desertion) Act, S.O. 1888, c. 23; Deserted Wives'
MaintenanceAct, 1901, S.B.C. 1901, c. 18; Children of UnmarriedParentsAct, R.S.O. 1927, c. 188;
and Children of UnmarriedParentsAct, R.S.B.C. 1922, c. 9.
'3 Willrich, "Home Slackers," ibid.
"' Lori Chambers, Misconceptions. UnmarriedMotherhood and the Ontario Children of
Unmarried ParentsAct, 1921-1969 (Toronto: The Osgoode Society/University of Toronto Press,
2007); Chris Clarkson, Domestic Reforms. Political Visions and Family Regulation in British
Columbia, 1862-1940 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007).
1 Chunn, supra note 10.
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phenomenon never displaced the location or relation of the primary
responsibility.16
The second type of legislation and policy, aimed at shoring up
flawed versions of the nuclear family, provided forms of financial
assistance to sole-support mothers. In a departure from laissez-faire
conceptions of poverty as strictly an individual problem, both the
political right and left came to agree that the state should provide some
financial support for poor, sole-support mothers.17 However, differences
emerged about the social policy, about the form and content of the
legislation, and about who would assume the fiscal responsibility for
such assistance. In Canada, the entire period from the late nineteenth
century to the mid-twentieth century was marked by ongoing strained
relations between different levels of government about who should pay
for what. The assumption of local fiscal responsibility for welfare by the
provincial and federal governments was grudging, slow, and uneven.
This trajectory of welfare development is illustrated by the
implementation of two types of social legislation that benefited solesupport mothers: one was rights-based, and employment or servicerelated as exemplified by provincial workers' compensation laws and the
Canadian Patriotic Fund; 18 the other, as exemplified by the provincial
statutes dealing with mothers' pensions or allowances, was needs-based
and means-tested. 19
During the First World War, proponents of state aid to solesupport mothers often characterized such support as analogous to
pensions for soldiers' service rather than as "an extension of private
charity,"2 and some sought a federal-level mothers' pension."' The most

"6 Willrich, "Home Slackers," supra note 2 at 486, found the same emphasis on individual
(male) responsibility for family maintenance. See also Chunn, ibid.
" Nancy Christie, Engendering the State: Family, Work, and Welfare in Canada(Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2000).
1"The Canadian Patriotic Fund (CPF) "originated during the Boer War as a private
organization to help the wives and children of volunteer recruits." See ibid at 50. However, the
CPF became a large-scale national relief organization with semi-official status when a centralized
national fund was established in 1914. See ibid.at 51-52.
11A related family welfare initiative was the means-tested old age pension, introduced by
the federal government in 1927, which theoretically worked in tandem with provincial parents'
maintenance legislation aimed at enforcing children's obligations to support their parents. See Old
Age PensionsAct, R.S.C. 1927, c. 156.
'oChristie, supra note 17 at 132.
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radical advocates of such policies also sought legislation that would
entrench a breadwinner-homemaker model based on the concept of a
male family wage, albeit for different reasons. Whereas feminists sought
to reinforce the woman's role as full-time homemaker and envisaged state
funding that would enable sole-support mothers to devote all their
energies to mothering, organized labour supported state aid to single
mothers as a means of protecting men's position in paid labour by
keeping such women from competing with men for jobs and undercutting
men's wages.
. During the inter-war period, however, movements for provincial
mothers'
allowances
gained momentum."2
Ultimately, social
conservatives who embraced old ideas about poverty prevailed.
Feminists on the political right,2 3 together with state bureaucrats,
politicians, and others concerned about undermining self-reliance and
encouraging pauperization, successfully argued against the idea that the
state should provide single mothers with funding equivalent to the
missing husband's contribution to the family wage. This much more
circumscribed vision of state assistance was the one ultimately
incorporated into the mothers' allowance legislation that was
implemented by most provincial governments in Canada during the
inter-war period. 4

21 In British Columbia, for example, Helena Gutteridge, a feminist trade-unionist,
persuaded the Vancouver Trades and Labour Council to lobby for a national pension in 1915. See
Margaret Little, "Claiming a Unique Place: The Introduction of Mothers' Pensions in B.C." (1995)
105-06 B.C. Studies 80 at 88 [Little, "Claiming a Unique Place"].
22
Christie, supra note 17.
23 For example, Charlotte Whitton, Executive Director of the Canadian Council on Child

Welfare (CCCW), later the Canadian Council on Child and Family Welfare (CCCFW), had
initially evinced fierce opposition to mothers' pensions and allowances. See Dennis Guest, The
Emergence of Social Security in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1980) at 56-57; Christie, supra
note 17 at 162-64.
24 Megan Davies, "'Services Rendered, Rearing Children for the State': Mothers' Pensions
in British Columbia 1919-1931" in B.K. Latham & R.J. Pazdro, eds., Not Just Pin Money Selected
Essays on the History of Women's Work in British Columbia (Victoria: Camosun College, 1984)
249; Little, "Claiming a Unique Place," supra note 21; Margaret Little, No Car, No Radio, No
Liquor Permit: The Moral Regulation of Single Mothers in Ontario, 1920-1997(Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1998) [Little, No Car,No Radio]; Veronica Strong-Boag, "Wages for Housework:
Mothers' Allowances and the Beginnings of Social Security in Canada" (1979) 14 J. Can. Stud. 24;
Veronica Strong-Boag, "Canada's Early Experience with Income Supplements: The Introduction of
Mothers' Allowances" (1979).4:2 Atlantis 35. Legislation was enacted in Manitoba (1916);
Saskatchewan (1917); Alberta (1919); British Columbia (1920); Ontario (1920); Nova Scotia
(1930); Quebec (1937); and New Brunswick (1944). See e.g. The Mothers' Allowance Act, S.O.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

A.

[VOL. 45, NO. 4

PoorSingle.Mothersand Pre-Keynesian Welfare Reform

As feminists from across a range of disciplines have
demonstrated, legislation and policies of liberal capitalist states have
long contemplated and supported a particular family formheterosexual, patriarchal, and nuclear-with a breadwinner husband, a
stay-at-home wife, and "legitimate" children.25 In this part, we
demonstrate and emphasize that the commitment to this model of
family and, to a certain extent, its needs informed the pre-Keynesian
welfare state. Our review of Canadian income security legislation
illustrates the primacy of the patriarchal family form over this period; the
plans were designed to compensate for its losses or failures rather than to
transform or alter its shape or place. We have reviewed the first mothers'
allowance/pension legislation enacted in five Canadian provinces (British
Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario, and Nova Scotia) between
1917 and 1930.6 Our review demonstrates that while the five provincial
regimes contained many congruities, there were also interesting
differences, not the least of which were the dates.of enactment.27
It is clear that despite their regional and population differences,
the statutes in this first wave of provincial mothers' allowance legislation
each imposed detailed and demanding conditions for entitlement upon
indigent mothers seeking to avail themselves of the modest allowances

1920, c.89 [MAA (Ontario)]; An Act to Provide for the Payment of Allowances towards the
Maintenance of the Dependent Children of Certain Mothers, S.N.S. 1930, c.4. Likewise, 39 of 48
American states had similar legislation by 1920. See Little, "Claiming a Unique Place," supra note
21 at 81; Christie, supra note 17.
' See e.g. Mary McIntosh, "The State and the Oppression of Women" in Annette Kuhn &
Ann Marie Wolpe, eds., Feminism and Materialism (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1978) 254;
Elizabeth Wilson, Women and the Welfare State (London: Tavistock, 1977); Linda Gordon,
Heroes of Their Own Lives: The Politics and History of Family Violence, 1880-1960 (New York:
Penguin Books, 1989); Linda Gordon, Women, the State, and Welfare (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1990); Linda Gordon, PitiedBut Not Entitled Single Mothers and the Historyof
Welfare, 1890-1935 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); Nancy Fraser, Justice Interruptus."
CriticalReflections on the "Postsocialist"Condition (New York: Routledge, 1997) at 41.
26 These provinces represent three western provinces, home to many new immigrants who
were not British subjects, one maritime province, and Ontario (Canada's most populous province).
We recognize that our list neglects the important contribution of the province of Manitoba, which
enacted the first mothers' allowance legislation, the cultural specificity of the Quebec experience,
and other maritime provinces of the period (New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island). We intend
to address the legislation and social policy of these provinces in subsequent work.
2Of these five provincial regimes, Nova Scotia's first legislation was enacted in 1930, more
than a full decade later than the others.
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provided by the state. 28 The eligibility hurdles were high and numerous,
including long waiting periods, requirements concerning marital status,
residency, number and age of children, and specified reasons for the
absence or incapacitation of the husband.
All five provincial statutes required women to provide evidence
of both Canadian and provincial residency, although the precise length
of the residency requirement varied by province. While immigrant
women were not formally precluded from accessing mothers' allowance,
some provinces required women to be British subjects (£e., born in
Canada or elsewhere in the British Empire) or wives or widows of
British subjects.2 9 Conversely, the prairie provinces, home to many
European immigrants, did not require the mothers to be British
subjects.3" First Nations women were excluded by two provinces-at first
expressly, 3 and later implicitly3 2-- ostensibly because of the federal
government's constitutional responsibility for Indians.
Widows figured significantly in the early legislation, though
benefits were gradually extended to women whose husbands were
institutionalized in mental hospitals, or in penitentiaries, or were
incurably ill.33 Even when the benefits appeared to be available only to

28 MAA (Ontario), supra note 24, s. 3(g); Mothers' Allowances Act, S.N.S. 1930, c. 4, s.
5(l)(b) [MAA (N.S.)]; Mothers' Pensions Act, S.S. 1917, c. 68, s. 2 [MPA (Saskatchewan)];
Mothers' Allowances Act, 1922, S.S. 1921-1922, c. 73 [MAA (Saskatchewan)]; Mothers' Pensions
Act, S.B.C. 1920, c. 61, s. 4(d) [MPA (B.C.)]. Alberta's legislation was couched in slightly different
terms. See Mothers Allowance Act, S.A. 1919, c. 6, s. 4 [MAA (Alberta)], which provided that if a
female widow or a wife of a man committed to a hospital for the insane was unable to "take proper
care" of her sons under the age of 15 and/or her daughters under the age of 16, she was permitted
to apply for assistance under this legislation.
29
MAA (Ontario),ibid., s. 3(e); MPA (B.C), ibid., s. 4(a); MAA (N.S.),ibid., s. 5(1)(g).
0

Their legislation was silent in this respect.
" Nova Scotia's legislation expressly excluded mothers who were Indians, as defined by the
federal Indian Act, R.S.C. 1927, c.98. See MAA (N.S.), supra note 28, s. 5(1)(h).
32 In 1956, Alberta restricted eligibility to persons who, for the purposes of health and
welfare services, were the responsibility of-the federal government. See Mothers' Allowance Act,
S.A. 1956, c. 35, s. 4.
li Saskatchewan and British Columbia extended eligibility to women whose husbands had
been sentenced to a penitentiary, had been committed to an institute for incurables, or were
permanently incapacitated by reason of incurable disease or insanity. See MAA (Saskatchewan),
supra note 28; MPA (B.C.), supra note 28. The British Columbia statute also extended benefits to
women whose husbands were sick or were in an accident while the women were residing in British
Columbia. Ontario provided that women who were widows or wives of inmates of mental hospitals
or whose husbands were permanently disabled were eligible to apply. Nova Scotia limited eligibility
to widows with at least two dependent children. See MAA (N.S.),supra note 28, s. 5(1).

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 45, NO. 4

widows, these provinces demonstrated legislative ingenuity in expanding
the definition of a widow.34 Although deserted wives were expressly
encompassed by some provinces from the earliest days,3 5 these women
nonetheless faced onerous, indeed punitive, requirements in the form of
waiting periods of as long as five 36 or seven years.37 Remarriage resulted
in the termination of assistance,38 which was relevant only for the
handful of deserted wives who could manage to obtain a divorce in the
period prior to 1968 and the enactment of Canada's first federal Divorce

' Nova Scotia and Alberta maintained the category of "widow" as the criterion for
eligibility, but they were prepared to broaden its definition. As other provinces amended their
legislation to allow mothers with one child to apply for assistance, Nova Scotia steadfastly limited
mothers' allowances to widows with two dependent children until 1943 when, by regulation, the
definition of "widow" was expanded to include women whose husbands were unable to support
their family due to permanent physical or mental disability. See Mothers'Allowances Act, S.N.S.
1943, c. 26, s. 3. In 1936, Alberta allowed deserted wives to apply and extended the definition of
"widow" in its mothers' allowance legislation to include "any married woman who by order of a
District Court Judge is declared to have been deserted, without reasonable cause, by her husband
for a continuous period of five years or upwards ....
" See Mothers'AllowanceAct, S.A. 1936, c. 38,
ss. 2(b), 3. In 1942, Alberta broadened the definition of "widow" to include wives who had obtained
a judicial order declaring that they had been deserted by their husbands, without reasonable cause,
for a continuous period for five years or more. See An Act to Aid Indigent Widows and Wives of
Insane Personin the Support of Children,R.S.A. 1942, c. 302, s. 2(e).
3s From the beginning, British Columbia expressly encompassed a deserted wife within its
mothers' allowance legislation. See Mothers' Allowance Act, S.B.C. 1920, c. 61, s. 2. Ontario
followed suit in 1921, making it possible for "abandoned" women with children under the age of
sixteen to receive an allowance; Mothers' Allowance Act, S.O. 1921, c. 79, ss. 2, 6. It should be
noted as well that Saskatchewan, and later Ontario, made it possible for "dependent husbands" to
apply for assistance under social assistance legislation. Saskatchewan's legislation provided that
allowances were to be made available to indigent persons or to a person in "necessitous
circumstances" for the support or partial support of a dependent child. See Social Aid Act, S.S.
1944, c. 61, as am. by S.S. 1946, c. 92, s. 2 [SocialAid (Saskatchewan) and Social AidAct, S.S. 1947,
c. 95. Saskatchewan's 1949 regulations under this statute provided that an allowance could be paid
to either a mother or a father. In order to be eligible, a father had to be "incapacitated" and his
wife had to be deceased, in a mental hospital, in prison, or otherwise absent by having deserted the
household. The Saskatchewan regulations defined "incapacitated" as a "condition of physical or
mental illness or disability from which there appears to be no prospect of improvement for a period
of nine months from the date of application for an allowance, of such a nature as to render a person
incapable of maintaining himself or his family." See S. Reg. 127/1949, Schedule "A" [S. Reg. 127].
Ontario's legislation also provided for a widowed or dependent father whose wife was a patient in a
sanatorium or hospital or in a similar institution. See Mothers' and Dependent Children's
Allowance Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 247, s. 2(b). In Saskatchewan, a woman's marriage or remarriage
had the effect of terminating her entitlement to an allowance. See S. Reg. 127, s. 22(a).
36

See e.g. Alberta's Mothers'AllowanceAct, supra note 34, s. 2(e).

37Child.Welfare Act, S.S. 1930, c. 70, s. 1.
-8See

S. Reg. 127, supra note 35, s. 22(a).
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Act.39 Many feminists have focused on another moral criterion in this
early legislation: most provinces included an explicit requirement that
the mother be a fit and proper person to have care and/or custody of her
children. n While this legislative requirement has been an obvious target
for feminist critique, it is important to note that it was not, as some have
intimated,4 an expression or an extension of the British subject
requirement. The "fit and proper" requirement was linked directly to
the woman's abilities as a mother; the British subject requirement,
under those provincial schemes that required it, was a separate limiting
condition.
No discussion of the early social assistance legislation is
complete without a consideration of family law support measures, which
provinces also began to enact in the post-First World War period in
order to impose child support obligations on parents (read: fathers) of
illegitimate children. 42 This is partly because, as discussed above,
provinces began to require women to pursue their husbands and the
fathers of their children for financial support in order to be eligible for
social assistance.43

39

S.C. 1968, c. 24.

4'In Ontario, the phrase was "fit and proper person to have the care and custody of her
children." See MAA (Ontario), supra note 24, s. 3(f). In Nova Scotia, the mother had to be "... in
every respect a fit, proper and suitable person to have the custody and care of her-children." See
MAA (N.S.),supra note 28, s. 5(l)(a). Saskatchewan's first statute to deal with this issue made no
mention of the "fit" criterion. See MPA (Saskatchewan), supra note 28, s. 2. However, MAA
(Saskatchewan), supra note 28, s. 3(2)(d) included the criterion of a "fit and proper person to have
care and custody of such child or children." In British Columbia the phrase was "a fit and proper
person to have the custody of her child or children." See MPA (B.C), supra note 28, s. 5(a).
Alberta's legislation was couched in slightly different terms, containing no explicit reference to this
criterion, although by s. 4, an inspector was mandated to do a thorough investigation to ensure that
the case was a "proper one for assistance." See MAA (Alberta),supra note 28, s. 5.
'

See e.g. Little, "Claiming a Unique Place," supra note 21.

42 This legislation took the form of deserted wives and children's maintenance legislation

and, later, legislation to impose support obligations upon unmarried parents. See the authors and
legislation cited in supra note 12.
' A relationship between eligibility for benefits or allowances and the pursuit of remedies
or support under other statutes began to appear-as early as 1945, when Saskatchewan replaced
abandonment as one criterion for eligibility and instead provided that a deserted wife could claim
under the statute if she had made reasonable efforts to execute an order from the court under the
provincial Deserted Wives' and Children'sMaintenance Act, R.S.S. 1940, c. 234 or the Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1927, c. 36. See Child Welfare Act, S.S. 1945, c. 100, s. 26(6) [Child Welfare
(Saskatchewan)]. The reference to the CriminalCode in this section refers to the criminal offence
of failing to provide the necessities of life to one's wife and children, for which husbands in the
period could be prosecuted. (Today, prosecutions under this section tend to involve parents who
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The other important aspect of Deserted Wives' initiatives was
the legislative restrictions on who could make applications. For instance,
Ontario's legislation required that a woman had to be living separately
from her husband because of his cruelty or his failure (without sufficient
cause) to support her and their children. Also, the woman herself could
not be "guilty" of adultery, nor could she make a claim against an
adulterous husband if she had condoned his adultery."
In sum, from this overview of the first wave of mothers'
allowance and social assistance legislation, one can see that the overriding policy of the legislation was to provide for indigent wives or
widows and their children when the husband/father was deceased,
incapacitated, incarcerated, or had deserted the family. The family unit
had to include dependent children in the custody of the mother who had
to be a fit and proper person to care for children. As the criteria for
eligibility gradually and unevenly expanded, so too did the requirements
imposed on women, such as waiting periods and mandatory efforts to
pursue absconding husbands for support. Clearly, these allowances
contemplated and circumscribed a particular family unit with a missing or
defective breadwinner. Support for the family was a (patriarchal)
responsibility of a husband or father. The family had to be supported, and
when he was not able to provide, for either good or bad reasons, the state
responded with modest support that came bundled with conditions.
B.

Pre-Keynesian Welfare Reform and the "Principle of Less
Eligibility"

The means-tested nature of the first wave of mothers' allowance
and related post-First World War welfare legislation left intact not only

have failed to provide proper medical care for their children or who have failed to protect their
child from an abusive parent or spouse.) This requirement was continued in Social Aid
(Saskatchewan),supra note 35. Under that statute, a mother was only eligible for social assistance if
her husband had deserted the family for at least one year and the husband was convicted for nonsupport, a court order for support had been issued, or the Welfare Board was satisfied that a
reasonable effort has been made to obtain support. See S. Reg. 127, supra note 35, s. 4(g). Divorced
mothers were also eligible for social assistance, subject to the same requirements. See S. Reg. 127,
supra note 35, s. 4(j). Similarly, an unmarried mother with a dependent child was eligible if she
could satisfy the Director of Child Welfare that reasonable effort to obtain support from the father
had failed. See S. Reg. 127, supra note 35, s. 4(f).
' This was the case as early as 1888 in Ontario. See Married Women (Maintenancein Case
of Desertion)Act 1888, S.O. 1888, c. 23, s. 5.

2007]

Mothers Need Not Apply

the distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor discussed
above, but also the "principle of less eligibility" that characterized the
nineteenth-century residual concept of welfare.4 5 In relation to poverty,
this principle implicitly requires that those deemed to be worthy of
assistance, including mothers who receive tate aid, should not be better
off materially than the least affluent families among the working poor.
While this principle has many implications, two in particular merit
discussion. First, "less eligibility" meant that the rates of assistance for
mothers who qualified for allowances remained at subsistence levels.
Although more minimal in some provinces than others, all rates for
mothers' allowances were dramatically lower than rates for other
welfare measures of the era, such as the Canadian Patriotic Fund and
Workmen's Compensation. The latter were rights-based pensions, which
generated benefits for wives and mothers because of past (male)
services to the war effort or to the paid labour force.46 In contrast to
mothers' allowances, these welfare measures also provided money to the
wife-recipient in her own right as well as money for her children.
Second, "less eligibility" meant that recipients of mothers'
allowances were expected to generate supplemental income. Research
indicates that this was the norm among women in working, poor families
where both husbands and wives may have embraced the sexual division
of labour, but lacked the family wage that would enable them to live in
conformity with the breadwinner-homemaker model.4 7 Denyse
Baillargeon's research on working poor families in Montreal during the
depression of the 1930s suggests, for instance, that "the image of the
homemaker wholly dependent on the male wage and exclusively
dedicated to housework and child care represented a virtually

45

Guest, supra note 23 at 36.

46

Christie, supra note 17 at 51-52.

47Denyse Baillargeon, "Indispensable But Not a Citizen: The Housewife in the Great
Depression" in R. Adamoski, D.E. Chunn & R. Menzies, eds., Contesting Canadian Citizenship.Historical Readings (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2002) 179; Eileen Boris & S. J Kleinberg,
"Mothers and Other Workers: (Re)Conceiving Labor, Maternalism, and the State" (2003) 15 J.
Women's History 90; Christie, supra note 17; Gwendolyn Mink, The Wages of MotherhoodInequality in the Welfare State, 1917-1942. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Joy Parr, The
Gender of Breadwinners. Women, Men, and Change in Two Industrial Towns, 1880-1950
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990); and Joan Sangster, EarningRespect. The Lives of
Working Women in Small-Town Ontario,1920-1960(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995).
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unattainable ideal for the majority of these poor working-class
households."48
Without a family wage, "family survival depended by necessity
on intensive domestic production and the extremely close management
of the household budget, to which were often added the earnings from
paid work of the mother of the family."49 Notwithstanding the social
disapproval of and the legal restrictions on wage-earning (married)
women, 50 many mothers with young children often engaged in paid
employment and/or a range of other paid work, including sewing;
knitting; taking in laundry, boarders, or other people's children; selling
homes;
home-baked goods; performing domestic work in other people's
'5 1
"
"moonshine.
making
and
engaging in forms of prostitution;
The many mother-supported families among the working poor
were equally important to the link between "less eligibility" and
mothers' allowances. Suzanne Morton found that between 1921 and
1931, sixteen per cent of all Halifax families with children were headed
by a single woman (mostly widows), many of whom engaged in the types
of paid work outlined above.52 Joy Parr's research on the gendered
labour force in the industries in two southern Ontario towns revealed
that female wage-earners in the Penmans knitting mill in Paris included
a large number of single mothers with children. In 1936, for example,
more than twenty-five per cent of female employees lived in singleheaded households, most of which included children. Moreover,
because of low textile wages, the acute financial need in single motherheaded households made lone mothers reliant on the wages of their

' Baillargeon, ibid.at 182. Baillargeon's qualitative research is based on 30 interviews with
francophone women.
49Ibid.
-" See Judy Fudge, "From Segregation to Privatization: Equality, the Law, and Women
Public Servants, 1908-2001" in Brenda Cossman & Judy Fudge, eds., Privatization,Law, and the
Challenge to Feminism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) 86.
1 See Janice Acton, Penny Goldsmith & Bonnie Shepard, eds., Women at Work: Ontario,
1850-1930 (Toronto: Canadian Women's Educational Press, 1974) on making "moonshine";
Sangster, supra note 47; and ibid.

I Suzanne Morton, "Women on Their Own: Single Mothers in Working-Class Halifax in
the 1920s" (1992) 21:2 Acadiensis 90. See Morton's discussion of Jessie Muir (a widow and her
seven children) who "survived the way most widows did before the welfare state: she used her home
to generate income, and perhaps also accepted occasional day work in the critical period before she
could depend on her children's labour." (at 90).
5

3Parr, supra note 47 at 28-29.
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children. 4 According to Parr, "[m]any women lived alone with their
children. Some were widowed, deserted, or never-married mothers who
moved to Paris with their children because it was a place where they,
with help from their teenagers, could assemble a family wage in the
55
absence of a male breadwinner.,
Given the precarious economic situation of the working poor, it is
hardly surprising that early mothers' allowance legislation implicitly or
explicitly contemplated that women would supplement their "allowance"
with money from paid work even when their children were of tender
years, since the rates did not differentiate on the basis of children's age.
From a policy standpoint, the provision of such state assistance was
based on the express policy that it was temporary, it was supplementary
to home-based or other earnings, and it was intended to help worthy
single mothers until they were able to (re)marry or to receive money
from wage-earning children, especially sons.56 Therefore, it is important
to be aware of the class-based aspects of legislation. At that time-and
still to this day-middle-class women were exhorted to be homemakers
and were criticized if they engaged in paid work. In contrast, the working
poor and/or single mothers received contradictory messages. They were
told that they should engage in paid labour either to stay off the dole or to
demonstrate that they were not idle and lazy; ironically, 57those who
engaged in paid labour at that time were criticized for doing so.
In Nova Scotia, for example, there was "a general prejudice
against wage-earning mothers."58 There, the Report of the Commission
on Mothers' Allowances adopted a contradictory position: it stated that
engaging in wage labour and taking in boarders was "inappropriate" for

54 Ibid.at 83.
55
56

Ibid
Christie, supra note 17 at 154-55; Morton, supra note 52 at 96-97; and Sangster, supra

note 47 at 129.
11These contradictions were also evident in other jurisdictions. Gwendolyn Mink cites a
1919 US study which found 69 per cent of the children of wage-earning mothers were between five
and fifteen years old. As a result, maternalists made recommendations that both recognized and
discouraged the need for wage work by women; it was recommended that while women could seek
part-time, outside employment, they should be barred from industrial home work, night work, and
part-time work when they had two or three children under the age of sixteen, and from any outside
work if they had five or more children under the age of sixteen. For maternal feminist leaders, "the
real solution to poverty and its consequences was a husband for every woman and a family wage for
every father." See Mink, supra note 47 at 44, 46.
5

9 Morton, supra note 52 at 96.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 45, NO. 4

mothers, but "accepted the belief that a mother should be able to
support at least one child."59 Joan Sangster has also identified the social
stigma as well as the economic marginalization suffered by single
mothers, and even widows. If women were on mothers' allowance and
took on supplementary wage work, "they were criticized for 'taking jobs
away from others' and "criticized by other citizens, including women,
for taking state money rather than working!"6
The strong adherence of many women on mothers' allowance to
familial ideology and the breadwinner ideal was equally contradictory.
Noting that eighty-nine per cent of mothers' allowance applicants in
Ontario "reported that they had had no employment outside the
domestic sphere,"'" Nancy Christie concluded that in the absence of a
male breadwinner, married women "preferred to receive government
welfare assistance rather than to seek work for wages and thereby
transgress on the breadwinner's role."62 She also argued that "[i]t is in
the context of women's wages, not the wages of the male breadwinner,
that the economic contribution of mothers' allowances must be
assessed."63 For widows in particular, "[b]ecause work was an enforced
necessity, it was not seen as an expression of self-worth and economic
independence when it conflicted with responsibilities in the home."'
We accept the argument advanced by Christie that the nuclear family
model became hegemonic among working class as well as middle-class
families during the early twentieth century. However, we also think the
analysis needs to address the question of the double day-an often
implicit, if not ubiquitous, implication of women's participation in the
labour market, and the extent to which the challenges of childcare or
leaving children alone, for example, may have made the male
breadwinner model attractive.65

's Ibid.at 100, citing Nova Scotia, Royal Commission on Mothers' Allowances, Report, in
Journals of the House of Assembly (Halifax: King's Printer, 1921).

6'Sangster, supranote 47 at 131.
6) Christie, supra note 17 at 146.
62

Ibid.at 314.

'Ibid. at 147 [emphasis in original].
64Ibid.at 148.
6

In contrast, Gwendolyn Mink's research shows that in mid-1920s Pennsylvania, although

women who received pensions were supposed to be full-time mothers, many recipients were
"moonlighting." Less than half of recipients' income came from pensions; 56.5 per cent came from
mothers' and children's wage work and rent from boarders/lodgers. Moreover, notwithstanding
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In Canada, the reformation of the laissez-faire form of state
from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century was both
discursive and material. On the discursive level, the distinction between
crime as a state responsibility and poverty as an individual problem
shifted as new discourses about poverty emerged and competed with old
ones that linked public assistance to pauperization and a pauper class.66
Thus, in the pre-Keynesian state poverty came to be viewed, to a limited
extent, as a private moral failing, as well as a collective, public problem:
the appropriate response was state intervention and/or assistance. At
the level of actual welfare provision, the change over time was clearly
more discursive than substantive. Economic welfare has always been
conceptualized in terms of the poor. Although state subsidization of
business has been a constant in Canada, it is never defined as such.67
Nonetheless, mothers' allowances did represent a qualitative
moment in Canadian welfare's legal history, inasmuch as the provinces
assumed some direct fiscal responsibility for supporting some poor, solesupport mothers. Much of the new legislation incorporated provisions
that were designed to ameliorate some forms of stigmatization.
Significantly, mother-recipients were constituted discursively not as
charity cases, but rather as government employees on contract, who
were charged with the responsibility of raising "good" citizens. Efforts
were also made to avoid public exposure and identification of recipients;
in many jurisdictions, for example, allowance cheques were mailed,
thereby sparing a woman the indignity of having to collect her cheque at
a public welfare office.
Mothers' allowance legislation did not fundamentally depart
from residual conceptions of welfare,68 despite factors including diversity
in rates and qualifying criteria.69 The legislation was clearly aimed at
reinforcing "private family welfare and self-support in the future," which

maternalist policy-makers' expectations that local policies would subsidize domesticity, states
permitted recipients to work outside the home under limited circumstances. The state of Illinois
even factored women's potential wages into determining eligibility and grant levels; two out of
three recipients between 1913 and 1915 worked for wages. See Mink, supra note 47 at 42.
'Chunn, supra note 10; Garland, supra note 10; and Willrich, City of Courts,supra note 2.
6

Wallace, supra note 7. See also Abramovitz, supra note 7.

sGuest, supra note 23 at 1-2 defines a residual concept of social security as a "minimal,
temporary type of service, offered at the discretion of the social welfare agency, meeting need only
after evidence had been presented that all other avenues of help had been explored ....
"
69
Christie, supra note 17 at 132-35; Little, No Car,No Radio,supra note 24 at 39.
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was a rejection of the maternal feminist argument "that poverty and
gender were linked."7 In sum, the introduction of mothers' allowances
and pensions challenged the notion that sustaining families was an
individual responsibility in such a way that reasserted that the primary
responsibility was an individual one. The state's assumption of a role in
providing for women-and later children-was minimal, grudging, and
always residual. Moreover, as Christie argues, "the notion that welfare
was primarily a private and family responsibility continued to animate
the discourse on welfare even during the Second World War when the
modern social security state was being created."7 1
SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY
TRANSITIONAL MOMENT

III.

IN

CANADA:

THE

The Keynesian welfare state in Canada was very much the
outcome of ongoing political and constitutional struggles both within
and between local, provincial, and federal governments regarding public
responsibility for welfare generally, and social assistance in particular.
As the quote from James Struthers at the outset of this article indicates,
the origins of income security in Canada began with motherhood,
through the introduction of mothers' allowance statutes. This legislation
represented the historic success of feminists, labour leaders, and other
reformers in pressuring the provinces to relieve local governments, in
full or in part, for the costs of providing financial assistance to qualifying
sole-support mothers. The mothers' allowance legislation remained in
place when the federal government ushered in the Canada Assistance
Plan Act (CAP) in 1966.72 The CAP was the Canadian version of the
1960s "War on Poverty"-a federal cost sharing plan that established
general criteria for social assistance programs across Canada, which
were designed to remove "arbitrary eligibility restrictions. ' 73 Introduced

7

Christie, ibid. at 149.

71Ibid.at 4. In Christie's view, the province of Manitoba was the worst in using mothers'

allowances "to bolster a widow's incentive to work" (at 165). In 1917, only 56 per cent of Manitoba
beneficiaries earned supplemental wages; by 1926-27. 80 per cent worked outside the home.
72CanadaAssistance PlanAct, S.C. 1966-67, c.45.
z Judy LaMarsh, Minister of Health & Welfare, quoted by Struthers, supra note 1 at 233.
Struthers notes the "tepid support" (at 233) for the Canada Assistance Plan from its inception,
arguing that only as a result of Prime Minister Lester Pearson's political commitment to the War
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by the same federal Liberal government that introduced the Medical
CareAct in 1966, 74 the CAP used federal funds (in the form of transfer
75
payments to the provinces) to support and deliver provincial programs.
The enactment of the CAP was thus a defining moment in the
history of the Canadian welfare state. For the first time, the federal
government assumed a degree of ongoing fiscal responsibility for social
assistance programs that fell within provincial jurisdiction under the
Constitution's division of powers.76 Struthers argued:
The main significance of the plan lay not in defining national standards, which in the
political context of the mid-1960s was unlikely in any case, but in markedly expanding the
scope of federal financing for social assistance costs across the country. Here, the
provinces, including Ontario, played a leading role in pushing Ottawa far beyond its
initial willingness 77simply to include mothers' allowance cases within a new general
assistance scheme.

In both this part and the following part of this article, we pay
particular attention to the form and content of welfare law reform in the
province of Ontario. We do this not only because Ontario played a
prominent role in making the case for the CAP, but also because when
the foundations of the CAP began to crack, Ontario was one of two
provinces that was most affected by it. 78 In the wake of the CAP's
demise, Ontario Premier Mike Harris's Conservative government led an
unrivalled initiative to redefine and restructure the nature and scope of
public assistance.

on Poverty, "the Canada Assistance Plan became a core component of Ottawa's pledge to eliminate
poverty in the April 1965 Speech from the Throne." (at 234).
74 Medical Care Act, S.C. 1966-67, c. 64. This first federal health statute established a
formula for federal transfers to the provinces based on the provinces' health insurance
expenditures. See currently CanadaHealth Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6.
I Sylvia Bashevkin, Welfare Hot Buttons. Women, Work, and Social Policy Reform
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) at 17.
76 The federal government had contributed millions of dollars to the provinces for public
relief during the depression era of the 1930s, but this assistance was viewed as a temporary rather
than an ongoing fiscal commitment.
'Struthers, supra note 1 at 235.
' 5The other province was British Columbia. Regarding British Columbia, see Seth Klein
& Andrea Long, A Bad Time to Be Poor: An Analysis of British Columbia's New Welfare
Policies (Vancouver: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2003); Gwen Brodsky et al.,
Human Rights Denied. Single Mothers on Social Assistance in British Columbia (Vancouver:

The Poverty and Human Rights Centre, 2006), online: <http://www.povertyandhumanrights.org/
docs/denied.pdf>.
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Under the CAP, the federal government's payments were based
on the principle of matching funds: each provincial dollar spent was
matched by a federal dollar. The new terrain of federal cost sharing also
incorporated child welfare and social administration goals, over "fierce
opposition" by federal finance officials.7 9 Child welfare was successfully
included as a result of its intimate connection with mothers' allowances,
which the federal government had agreed to include under the CAP."
With the arrival of funds from the CAP, many provinces began
to consolidate their social assistance programs. Ontario, for example,
introduced new legislation in 1967 that repealed the mothers' allowance
legislation and consolidated all the "existing categorical programs for
the old, the blind, the disabled, for elderly widows and unmarried
women, and for women with dependent children into one single longterm assistance program administered by the province.""1 Mother-led
families formed the largest part of the rising numbers in welfare
caseloads; in Ontario alone, this number "jumped by 302 per cent"
between 1961 and 1973.82 This was an increase to "exactly a third of the
province's entire welfare caseload by 1973" that was "fuelled by
liberalized eligibility requirements and a rising rate of family
fragmentation."83 Moreover, while mother-led families declined as a
proportion of all welfare recipients between 1973 and 1991, 4 the
decrease was numerical, not ideological; notwithstanding their reduced
numbers, single mothers on welfare continued to figure prominently in
the public and political imagination.

'Struthers, supra note 1 at 235.
o Saskatchewan had long since incorporated mothers' allowance into its child welfare
legislation, and later into its social assistance legislation. In 1945, Saskatchewan extended benefits
to unmarried mothers and their "illegitimate" children. See Child Welfare (Saskatchewan), supra
note 43, s. 26(2). This was renewed in the SocialAid (Saskatchewan), supra note 35, which replaced
the Child Welfare Act. See also S. Reg. 127, supra note 35, s. 4.
8 Struthers, supra note 1 at 237. The legislation to which Struthers refers was the first Family
Benefits Act, S.O. 1966, c. 54. See also Family Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.2. The General Welfare
Assistance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. G.6 was also amended by S.O. 1967 c. 31 to provide assistance for
single employable men and the families of employable men. This latter piece of legislation was to be
administered by local municipalities, which promised to pose problems with consistency and fairness
across the province. Unfortunately, that promise was realized.
2

Struthers, ibid.at 242.

3

Ibid.

8 Maureen Baker & David Tippin, Poverty, Social Assistance, and the Employability of
Mothers.- Restructuring Welfare States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).
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The Keynesian period of "liberalization" proved to be relatively
short-lived-just under a decade. That duration was scarcely long enough
to be regarded as an "era." Indeed, some have argued that the Keynesian
welfare state began to come undone even at the moment when it
appeared to be expanding." Rice and Prince have argued that the growth
of the Canadian welfare state came to an end by the mid 1970s:
The old economic ideas of laissez-faire began to have greater impact on the thinking of
policy makers, and a new attitude developed which called for dramatic changes to the
existing [and only just established] system. In response, governments cut some programs,
froze others, and allowed for limited new initiatives over the 1970s and 1980s. ... There
was resistance by policy making elites to introduce any further major reforms such as
national child care,
and various social programmes were changed to those with a more
8 6
residual character.

Two conclusions can be drawn here. First, the life of the CAPwhich rested on the weak foundation of the young Canadian welfare
state- was as precarious as it was short-lived. Second, the "privatization
agenda" (of concern to feminists) was but a part of larger monetarist
policies. Thus, it is important to note this short life of the CAP within
the only slightly longer history of state-sponsored social welfare
provision for poor mothers in Canada. Additionally, as we will illustrate
below, the dismantling of the "liberal" welfare system took less than half
that time; by 1995, in Ontario, the neo-liberals seemed to be the only
form of liberals remaining.
During the 1984 federal election campaign, the leader of the
Progressive Conservative Party, Brian Mulroney, characterized Canada's
social programs as a "sacred trust," promising that "no social program ...
affecting anyone in need ...[would] be touched by a Progressive
Conservative government."87 Once elected, the Mulroney-era federal
Tories introduced policies intended to encourage "work readiness"
programs for social assistance recipients. But perhaps the most significant
decision of the Conservative government was to impose a "cap on CAP"
payments to the three wealthiest provinces: Ontario, British Columbia,

'Judy Fudge & Brenda Cossman, "Introduction: Privatization, Law, and the Challenge to
Feminism" in Brenda Cossman & Judy Fudge, eds., Privatization,Law, and the Challenge to
Feminism, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) 3.
86
James J. Rice & Michael J.Prince, ChangingPoliticsof CanadianSocial Policy(Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2000) at 234.

'As quoted by Bashevkin, supranote 75 at 28.
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and Alberta. This decision had a particularly strong impact on the social
democratic governments in British Columbia and in Ontario.
The government of British Columbia unsuccessfully challenged
the constitutionality of the "cap on CAP,"88 and later imposed a threemonth residency requirement as a condition of eligibility for social
assistance. In Ontario, the federal "cap on CAP" was triggered by the
newly elected New Democratic Party (NDP) government's decision to
implement the recommendations for wide-ranging, liberal reforms of
the province's welfare system contained in Transitions,the 1988 Report
of the Social Assistance Review Committee.8 9 The federal government
was particularly concerned about Transitions' recommendation for
higher, fully indexed welfare benefits.9" This report would prove to be
the final rallying call for higher welfare benefits during this transitional
period. Its other major recommendation, controversial among welfare
rights activists at the time, called for the creation of a discrete child's
benefit. This recommendation was regarded as controversial because it
separated children's needs from those of the caregiving custodial parent.
Transitions was one of the first public documents to identify and
characterize children's poverty and needs as (potentially) discrete and
capable of being calculated (and remedied) separately from those of
their parents. 91 As we will discuss below, in 2007, the Ontario
government would revisit the creation of a separate children's benefit.
The government proposed to sever the child's benefit from his or her
parent's social assistance, which would be paid to the parent on behalf
of the child.
Bashevkin notes that the "cap" imposed on Ontario "cost the
Ontario treasury an estimated $10 billion over five years ...[as] the
federal government's share of social assistance costs in Ontario had
fallen from roughly 50 per cent to less than 30 per cent., 92 She argues

'Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.), [199112 S.C.R. 525.
s9 Ontario, Ministry of Community & Social Services, Social Assistance Review Committee,
Transitions (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1988). See Dorothy E. Chunn & Shelley A.M. Gavigan,
"Welfare Law, Welfare Fraud, and the Moral Regulation of the 'Never Deserving' Poor" (2004) 13
Soc. & Leg. Stud. 219, for a discussion of the Social Assistance Review Committee's
recommendations in relation to welfare fraud. See also Dianne L. Martin, "Passing the Buck:
Prosecution of Welfare Fraud; Preservation of Stereotypes" (1992) 12 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 52.
9'See Bashevkin, supranote 75 at 33.
91

Ibid.at 114-119.

92

Ibid. at 33.
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that "[t]he cap on CAP combined with more experience in office took
the shine off the Ontario NDP's critique of punitive, pro-workfare
attitudes."93 The NDP government went on to introduce a range of
punitive welfare policies, including the euphemistic
"enhanced
94
verification measures" and the infamous "snitch lines.,
Official and public concerns with government deficits (created
by government policies) also led to a reorientation of the federal
Liberals during the 1990s. They became preoccupied with the costs of
the welfare state, a development that facilitated the effective transfer of
responsibility for social policy to then-Minister of Finance, and future
prime minister, Paul Martin.95 Under Martin's leadership, the
Department of Finance "went about redefining the contours of the
welfare state."96 The agenda of this Liberal government was clearly
more "neo" than liberal, and was a Canadian version of the downsizing
and off-loading of welfare that occurred in the United States under
Democratic President Bill Clinton. 97 The federal Liberals pursued,
indeed were wedded to, what Rice and Prince have characterized as a
"monetarist" agenda of policies. This included "free trade pacts, deficit
reduction, the deregulation of certain markets, the privatization of some
public services, the limitation of collective bargaining and union powers,
a reduction in the number of public employees, the transformation of
the tax system, the restructuring of local governance structures ...and
the promotion of charities and other community groups as vehicles for
meeting social needs"-in short a "downsizing" of the state. 98
For our purposes, the "downsizing" of federal responsibility is
best illustrated by the new Canadian Health and Social Transfers
provisions, which, when introduced, reconfigured the nature of federal
transfer payments in Canada. In 1995, this legislation replaced the CAP
and facilitated deep cuts to federal spending (transfer payments to
provinces) which, in turn, ensured the wholesale restructuring of

93Ibid.
95

Chunn & Gavigan, supra note 89.
Bashevkin, supra note 75 at 81.

97

I
Ibid.;
see also Rice & Prince, supra note 86.
Bashevkin, ibid.; Abramovitz, supra note 7.

' Rice & Prince, supranote 86 at 138-39; see also Fudge & Cossman, supra note 85.
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provincial social assistance programs.9 9 As we will discuss below,
nowhere was this phenomenon more clearly expressed than in the new
welfare legislation of the neo-liberal common sense revolutionaries, led
by Premier Mike Harris of Ontario who was elected in 1995. Almost
immediately, Ontario's thirty-year-old welfare legislation was repealed,
and replaced by the exhortatory Ontario WorksAct 0
The Ontario Conservatives restructured provincial welfare
legislation along explicitly neo-liberal lines. The legislation expressed all
the hallmarks of neo-liberal discourse: "family benefits" and "general
welfare assistance" ceased to exist as legal forms. The Ontario Works
Act suggested that discourse theorists were alive and well as crafters of
Ontario's welfare policy. The stated purpose of the legislation truly
reads like a neo-liberal credo.''
Entitlements to "welfare" and "family benefits" were replaced
by a form of "short term financial assistance" which placed the emphasis
on individual responsibility and self-reliance through employment. Only
those Ontarians who are permanently disabled (under what is now a
higher threshold for and narrower definition of disability) remain
eligible for long term assistance. 2 Everyone else on "assistance" is
deemed to be employable, including elders and single mothers of

9 Bashevkin, supra note 75; Rice & Prince, ibid. at 234; Baker & Tippin, supra note 84;
Allan Moscovitch, "The Canada Health and Social Transfer" in Raymond B. Blake, Penny E.
Bryden & J. Frank Strain, eds., The Welfare State in Canada:Past Presentand Future (Toronto:
Irwin Publishing, 1997) 105. See also, Janet Mosher & Joe Hermer, Welfare Fraud: The
Constitution of Social Welfare as Crime (Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada, 2005) at 17 [Mosher
& Hermer, Welfare Fraud].
" Ontario Works Act, supra note 4. See Chunn & Gavigan, supra note 89; Janet Mosher
et al., Walking on Eggshells.-Abused Women's Experiences of Ontario's Welfare System (Final
Report of Research Findings from the Woman and Abuse Welfare Research Project, 5 April 2004)
[Walking on Eggshells]; Ian Morrison & Gwyneth Pearce, "Under the Axe: Social Assistance in
Ontario in 1995" (1995) 11 J. L. & Soc. Pol'y 1; Ian Morrison, "Ontario Works: A Preliminary
Assessment" (1998) 13 J. L. & Soc. Pol'y 1.
1 In s. 1 of the Ontario Works Act, supra note 4, the purpose of the legislation is
expressed in four subsections. The Act:
(a) recognizes individual responsibility and promotes self reliance through employment;
(b) provides temporary financial assistance to those most in need while they satisfy obligations to
become and stay employed;
(c) effectively serves people needing assistance; and
(d) is accountable to the taxpayers of Ontario.
See also Cossman, supranote 5; Mosher & Hermer, Welfare Fraud,supranote 99.
102 OntarioDisabilitySupport ProgramAct, S.O. 1997, c. 25, Sch. B.
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school-aged children. Also, as others have noted,"°3 for the Harris
conservative government any job was a good job.
The enactment of this legislation was followed by a relentless
crackdown on "welfare fraud"' 4 and immiseration of thousands of poor
people. The discursive construction of welfare recipients, including
single mothers, as people who "do nothing" and as a result are "paid for
doing nothing" is significant to this article. Since the early days of
mothers' allowance, when mothers were regarded as having a job to do
in raising children, single mothers on welfare have been reconstructed
as layabouts who do not labour and are rewarded for their indolence. As
Struthers notes, notwithstanding "its important accomplishments," the
CAP which symbolizes the Keynesian moment in Canada "ultimately
failed to alter, in any fundamental way, longstanding approaches to the
needs of the poor either in Ontario or in other provincial
jurisdictions."' 0 5 In the next section of this article, we consider the
expression of the more recent construction of welfare mothers, who
need not apply for welfare.
IV.

WOMEN AND WELFARE LAW REFORM: MOTHERS
NEED NOT APPLY NOW

Canadian feminist socio-legal scholars have begun to grapple
with the form and implications of the restructuring of the Canadian
welfare state for feminist analyses of law.'0 6 In particular, the
ascendance of the neo-liberal discourse of, and preoccupation with,
privatization has been the focus of much recent work. This new
literature has tended to reflect the disciplinary and research

" The explicit thinking behind the Ontario Works Act, supra note 4 is that "any job is a
good job" and employment opportunities are available if people are pressed to find employment.
Any job is thought to be preferable to "dependency" on social assistance. Entry-level jobs, even if
they are "bad" jobs, are believed to give a person an entry point to the labour market, from which
they can move up the earnings ladder. Online: Workfare Watch <http://www.welfarewatch.toronto.
on.ca/promises/intro.htm#earnings> [accessed 22 May 2005, site offline].
" Chunn & Gavigan, supra note 89; Mosher & Hermer, Welfare Fraud,supra note 99;
and Kiran Mirchandani & Wendy Chan, CriminalizingRace, CriminalizingPoverty: Welfare Fraud
Enforcement in Canada (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2007).
10 5Struthers, supra note 1 at 231.
'" See Boyd, supra note 8;Marlee Kline, "Blue Meanies in Alberta: Tory Tactics and the
Privatization of Child Welfare," in Boyd, supra note 8, 330; Brenda Cossman & Judy Fudge, eds.,
Privatization,Law, and the Challenge to Feminism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002).
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preoccupations of the scholars, and it is marked neither by a deep
immersion in nor by an appreciation of the history of the relationship
between women and welfare or of the history of the relationship
between welfare law and family law.' 7
Feminist legal scholars, whose primary research interests lie in
family rather than welfare law, have been particularly attentive to the
"familial ideological" dimensions of welfare law, as expressed most
clearly in the much amended definition of "spouse."'' 8 Not surprisingly,
much of their focus, informed by family law concerns, has been on the
various "spouse in the house" reforms and the extension of the
definition of spouse in welfare law to an ever-widening net of cohabiting
relationships, including same-sex cohabitation. In the current context,
Janet Mosher's research especially stands out because of her
policy on the
interrogation of the impact of welfare law and welfare law
10 9
lives of women attempting to leave abusive relationships.
Through interviews with welfare mothers, Mosher and her
colleagues were able to identify a number of implications of the Ontario
government's cuts to welfare rates and restructuring of welfare for
women attempting to flee abusive relations. Mosher's research made a
number of key thematic findings, not the least of which was that
"women's safety has been further compromised" by the welfare reforms,
which resulted in "grossly inadequate benefits, workfare, increased
scrutiny, and the changed definition of spouse, [that] have all operated
to make it even harder for women to leave their abusers and re-establish

107

For a notable early contribution, see Mary Jane Mossman & Morag MacLean, "Family

Law and Social Welfare: Toward a New Equality" (1986) 5 Can. J. Fam. L. 79.
"8See e.g. Brenda Cossman, "Family Feuds: Neo-Liberal and Neo-Conservative Visions of
the Reprivatization Project" in Brenda Cossman & Judy Fudge, eds., Privatization,Law, and the
Challenge to Feminism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) 169; Susan B. Boyd,
"(Re)Placing the State: Family, Law and Oppression" (1994) 9 C.J.L.S. 39; Shelley A.M. Gavigan,
"Paradise Lost, Paradox Revisited: The Implications of Familial Ideology for Feminist, Lesbian,
and Gay Engagement to Law" (1993) 31 Osgoode Hall L.J. 589; and Shelley A.M. Gavigan "Legal
Forms, Family Forms, Gender Norms: What is a Spouse?" (1999) 14 C.J.L.S. 127 [Gavigan, "Legal
Forms"].
I' Mosher et al., supra note 100. See also Janet E. Mosher, "Managing the Disentitlement
of Women: Glorified Markets, the Idealized Family, and the Undeserving Other" in Sheila M.
Neysmith, ed., Restructuring Caring Labour: Discourse, State Practice, and Everyday Life
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000) 30; Janet E. Mosher, "Welfare' Reform and the Remaking of the Model Citizen" in Margot Young et al., eds., Povertyv Rights,Social Citizenship, and
LegalActivism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 119.
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their lives.""' The threat of welfare fraud was found to be empowering
for the "louse in the house" men. 111
Despite the feminist scholarly preoccupation with the "spouse in
the house" issue, it appears that for the abused, poor women who were
interviewed, the "spouse in the house" issue is just one of many
concerns. Rather, in Walking on Eggshells, Mosher and her colleagues
found that abused women experienced many forms of abuse; their abuse
was not confined to an abusive spouse, and their abuse could occur both
inside and outside of their homes. They also identified the depth and
range of neo-liberal welfare law reform's adverse impacts: these
included inadequate benefits and a resulting inability to both feed the
kids and pay the rent; the empowerment of abusive men who used
welfare, such as using fraud snitch lines, as a means to harass their
former spouses; a myriad of impenetrable and changing eligibility rules;
and the debilitating effects of living under constant surveillance."'
Additionally, Walking on Eggshells confirms that extremely low
welfare rates and the alleged "culture of fraud" that has been created
extend beyond the discourse of "welfare cheats" to encompass everyone
who is on welfare-the never deserving poor." 3 Even abused women on
welfare who are "walking on eggshells" express the belief that they are
also "stealing from the government" when they are forced to rely on
4
social assistance."

"/0
Mosher et al., supra note 100 at 5.
...
This refers to men who could be found to be a spouse for the purposes of welfare law,
but in no other family law context. In the words of one woman interviewed by Mosher et a.:
He's got all kinds of thing to could do with me: report me to welfare for fraud. ... He can getaway
with assaulting me, you know ...He lived off me, sponged off me. I had no way to um, I had
absolutely no way to getoff the system. And not only that, the pressure of the system. I couldn't even
tell what was going on because they would cut my cheque. I couldn't even tell them that this guy was
sponging off me ...I mean you can't even get a guy outta' your house because now he has all the
power in the world. Welfare fraud, welfare, that's what it's all about. They just gained the biggest
stronghold they could ever gain and there'll be so many women that will be um, affected by that."
(Mosher etal.,
ibid. at 57-58).
Another woman spoke of her experience as follows:
...
he feels like he has the upper hand, because like I said they were harassing me because he kept
calling and saying that he was living with me when he wasn't. And you know, when he wasn't, but they
were harassing me though. ... (Mosher et al.,
ibid. at 58).
n2 Ibid.

Chunn & Gavigan, supra note 89.
4

1 Mosher etal., supra note 100.
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Recent feminist analysis of women and welfare, especially of the
"spouse in the house" amendments in Ontario, has invoked the
discourse of privatization to characterize the 1990s welfare reforms." 5
According to this argument, in the restructuring of the welfare state
along leaner and meaner neo-liberal lines, the focus of welfare policy
has shifted. The state is now said to be "reinforcing certain private
familial responsibilities for women's poverty ...
while diminishing public
societal commitment to alleviating that poverty."'' 6 In this context,
Brenda Cossman has observed that "[f]amily law is displacing social
welfare as the primary source for persons without market income.""7' '
Relying on scholarship on the gendered nature of privatization,
Cossman argues that there are in fact two "stories" in the reprivatization
strategy: the dislocation of the "public" in favour of "private support" in
family; and the fact that social welfare law coexists with a "rearticulation
of the 'traditional family.""' 8
We do not deny the social, economic, and rhetorical force of
neo-liberal attacks on welfare law, nor are we suggesting that the 1995
reforms in Ontario, for instance, were anything less than a full-out
assault on the poor. However, for us two questions remain. First, when
did the provision of social welfare ever dislocate or displace the
patriarchal family in fact, law, or social policy as the primary site of
responsibility for the support of family members? Second, when was
welfare ever more than at best a residual reinforcement of and support
for patriarchal responsibilities for the nuclear family?
In the decade following the initial neo-liberal reforms, litigation,
research, and advocacy campaigns attempted to restrain and redirect
welfare law and policy, with mixed results. Litigation based on the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms19 that challenged the
constitutionality of the dramatic reduction in welfare rates was

n5 See Cossman, supra note 5 at 170 regarding the discursive nature of "[tihe shift from
public responsibility to private self-reliance, from social welfare rights to individualized support
obligations ...[Ilt is important to emphasize that this shift operates at the level of the discursive
and not necessarily at the concrete level of women and children's lives."
"' Ibid.at 173, quoting Susan B. Boyd.
117
Ibid.
1 Ibid.
.. Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982 c. 11 [Charteri.
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unsuccessful, 2 1 whereas the challenge of the definition of "spouse"
12
ultimately enjoyed more success. 1

"20See Masse v. Ontario (Ministry of Community & Social Services) (1996), 89 O.A.C. 81
(Ont Div. Ct.). This deferential judicial approach to the substantive components of welfare policy
was supported by the Supreme Court of Canada in Gosselin v. Qu6bec (Attorney-General),[2002]
4 S.C.R. 429, where the Court effectively empowered provincial governments to set whatever
limitations on welfare programs they saw fit, even if it meant immiseration of welfare recipients.
The majority of the Court rejected any claims based on s. 15 and s. 7 of the Charter,ibid.
1
Falkiner v. Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services, Income Maintenance
Branch) (2002), 59 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.). The definition of the word "spouse" was challenged
in this case, and was declared unconstitutional by the Ontario Court of Appeal. The provincial
government received leave to appeal this decision to the Supreme Court of Canada, but following a
change of government, the new Attorney-General announced that the Liberal government would
not appeal the decision. Instead, it amended the regulations under the Ontario Works legislation to
meet the Ontario Court of Appeal's requirements. The different relevant definitions of the word
"spouse" were contained in the regulations below:
Family Benefits Act, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 366, s. 1:
(1) "spouse" means ... (d) a person of the opposite sex to the applicant or recipient who has resided
continuously with the applicant or recipient for a period of not less than three years.
(2) In determining whether or not a person is a spouse within the meaning of this Regulation, sexual
factors shall not be investigated or considered.
(3) Clause (d) of the definition of "spouse" in subsection (1) does not apply to a person who has
resided continuously for a period of not less than three years with the applicant or recipient and the
applicant or recipient provides evidence to the Director that the economic, social and familial aspects
of the relationship between the person and the applicant or recipient were such that the continuous
residing did not amount to cohabitation.
The FamilyBenefits Act replaced the Ontario Works Act, however, as noted by the Ontario Court of Appeal, the
"1995 definition [under the FamilyBenefits Act regulations] remain[ed] in force in substantially the same form"
in the Ontario Works Act. Note that opposite sex partners are defined in a separate definition in the regulation,
but are also covered by subsection (2). 0. Reg. 134/98 amended to 0. Reg. 231/04, s. I defined "spouse" as
follows:
(1) "spouse", in relation to an applicant or recipient, means,
(a) a person of the opposite sex to the applicant or recipient, if the person and the applicant or
recipient have together declared to the administrator or to the Director under the OntarioDisability
Support ProgramAct, 1997that they are spouses,
(b) a person of the opposite sex to the applicant or recipient who is required under a court order or
domestic contract to support the applicant or recipient or any of his or her dependants,
(c) a person of the opposite sex to the applicant or recipient who has an obligation to support the
applicant or recipient or any of his or her dependants under section 30 or 31 of the Family Law Act,
whether or not there is a domestic contract or other agreement between the person and the applicant
or recipient whereby they purport to waive or release such obligation to support, or
(d) a person of the opposite sex to the applicant or recipient who has been residing in the same
dwelling place as the applicant or recipient for a period of at least three months, if,
(i) the extent of the social and familial aspects of the relationship between the two persons is
consistent with cohabitation, and
(ii) the extent of the financial support provided by one person to the other or the degree of financial
interdependence between the two persons is consistent with cohabitation.
(2) For the purpose of the definitions of "spouse" and "same-sex partner", sexual factors shall not be
investigated or considered in determining whether or not a person is a spouse or same-sex partner.
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In roughly the same time period, while the government of
Ontario, in particular, was pursuing an aggressive campaign against
people on welfare, the federal and provincial governments increased the
Canadian Child Tax Benefit for low income families in Canada by
adding a new National Child Benefit Supplement (NCB). The NCB was
said to have been created "to prevent and reduce child poverty."' 22
However, the very poorest families never received the NCB because of a
provincial clawback that resulted in a deduction from the benefits of
parents on assistance.' 23 Despite the previous promise of the Ontario
Liberals, this clawback did not end with their first electoral victory.
Following the defeat of the provincial Conservative government
in the fall of 2003, the new Liberal government did, however, adopt a
different tone in relation to those people who are extremely poor. The
Minister of Community and Social Services condemned the previous
Conservative government for treating people on welfare as a "typical
punching bag" and she immediately committed the Liberal government
to a "series of [welfare] reforms.' ' 124 Although the new Liberal
government invoked the now axiomatic incantation of all
governments-"no tolerance for welfare fraud"-it also repealed the
legal expression of the Conservative government's punitive "zero
tolerance" policy that had been introduced in 2000. In January 2003, the
permanent ineligibility. sections of the regulations under the Ontario
Works Actwere repealed."z In December 2004, the Liberal government
also introduced a series of amendments to the regulations, which
ameliorated some of the worst excesses of the previous administration.
For instance, under the amended regulations the earnings of a
dependent child ceased to be considered an asset in determining the
eligibility of a benefit unit, 126 and Registered Education Savings Plans
122 Online:

The

National

Child

Benefit

<http://www.nationalchildbenefit.ca/ncb/

thenationall.shtml>. See also online: Hands Off our Baby Bonuses <http://www.incomesecurity.
org/campaigns/HandsOff/> [accessed May 22, 2005, site offline].'23 See Wanda A. Wiegers, "The National Child Benefit: Social Inequality Under the New
'Social Union' (2001-2002) 33 Ottawa L. Rev. 25.
124 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 17A (17

December 2003) at 868 (Hon. Sandra Pupatello).
' O. Reg 456/03.
'26 O. Reg. 395/04, s. 6(3). These changes, among others, had been recommended to the
Minister of Community and Social Services by Deb Matthews, Parliamentary Assistant to the
Minister, in her Review of Employment Assistance Programs in Ontario Works & Ontario
Disability Support Program (December 2004). This report, and the response to its
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also became exempt from the determination of assets (and thus no
longer needed to be cashed before the benefit unit became eligible for
benefits) 12 7 In June 2004, the Liberal government announced a modest
128
increase in benefits under the statutes.
Two welfare rights campaigns expressed the ongoing struggles
against the ideology and impact of neo-liberal welfare reform: "Feed the
Kids and Pay the Rent" and "Hands Off!" These welfare rights
campaigns-led by welfare mothers, their advocates, and their alliesdrew attention to the impact of extremely low welfare rates and the
targeted clawback of the NCB from the very poorest families. At the
same time, these campaigns reasserted the need for a form of "mothers'
allowance" in order to meet the needs of children with mothers on
welfare. 129 These campaigns reinserted the relationship between poor
mothers and their children into the public discourse about social
assistance and reminded the public of the vulnerability of single parent
families, mostly mother-led, who continued to be relegated to the lowest
ranks of the poor. 130

recommendations by the Income Security Advocacy Centre in May 2005 can be found online:
Income Security Advocacy Centre <http://www.incomesecurity.org/campaigns/past.html>.
1270. Reg. 395/04, ibid., s. 12(1), 13(4).
128

Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services, "Ontario Social Assistance Rate

Increase and Special Payments" (30 June 2004), online: Ontario Ministry of Community and Social
Services <http://www.cfcs.gov.on.ca/CFCS/en/newsRoom/fact Sheets/040630.htm>.
129 These campaigns were commenced and coordinated by an Ontario legal clinic, the
Income Security Advocacy Centre (ISAC), in collaboration with a number of community partners.
The campaigns involved a multi-pronged, integrated law reform strategy that included a postcard
campaign, addressed to Premier Dalton McGuinty, urging him to honour an election promise to
end the clawback of the NCBS made prior to his first election; intervention in electoral campaigns;
all-candidates meetings; community education and organization; a media strategy; and litigation on
Charter issues in the case of Chomolkin, Lance & Prine v. Her Majesty the Oueen in Right of
Canada, et al. For information on this still pending litigation, see online: Income Security Advocacy
Centre <http://www.incomesecurity.org/challenges/ChokomolinLancePrincev.HerMajestytheQueen
inRightofCanadaetal.html>. For information and an assessment of the campaign, see online:
Income Security Advocacy Centre <http://www.incomesecurity.org/campaigns/HandsoffCampaign.
html> [Hands Off].
I It is axiomatic to note the extent of the poverty of poor mother-led families in Canada.
They account for 90 per cent of all poor single-parent families and continue to have the highest
poverty rate out of all the most common family types. Their incomes are less than half of the
poverty line, according to Statistics Canada's low income cut-offs. See e.g. National Council of
Welfare, Poverty Profile, 2002-2003 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services
Canada, 2006) Figure 1.6 at 12. See also Wanda Wiegers, The Framing of Poverty as "Child
Poverty" andits Implicationsfor Women (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, 2002).
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In many ways, the most telling illustration of the neo-liberal
agenda in recent Canadian history continues to be Ontario's dramatic
cuts to benefit levels in order to save the public purse from paying
people "to do nothing." The sharply reduced welfare rates implemented
by the Conservative government in 1995 have witnessed only marginal
increases, while the reporting requirements, the scrutiny and discretion
of welfare workers, and the dearth of community and social supports
remain ongoing.
In our view, the implications of "Feed the Kids," "Hands Off!",
and Walking on Eggshells for feminist analyses of welfare, family law,
and neo-liberalism are significant. It is clear that the impact of neoliberal welfare law reform on the concrete lives of poor women and their
children extended further and deeper than the "spouse in the house"
definitions.
The two-year long "Hands Off!" campaign against the clawback
of the NCB experienced a bittersweet victory of sorts in March 2007,
when the provincial government announced the creation of a new
Ontario Child Benefit for all low-income families in Ontario. The
provincial government also promised that poor families will receive the
Ontario Child Benefit in addition to the NCB. 31 The introduction of
the Ontario Child Benefit was combined with a "rate restructuring,"
which lowered social assistance rates and allocated items that were
previously covered by those rates (e.g., winter clothing allowance) to the
separate NCB. The formal separation of children (as beneficiaries) from
their parents is both discursive and material.
In our view, analyses of "privatization" and "re-privatization" in
the context of welfare law do not sufficiently attend to the way in which
poverty, welfare, and family have historically been framed in liberal
states. The Keynesian form of privatization is rendered invisible by the
public support for the private sector and the family, which witnessed a
broadening support, together with the assumptions of patriarchal
familial ideology being more firmly embedded. Under this view,

implementation of the Ontario Child Benefit, and the resulting restructuring of
' '"The
social assistance that will happen in July, 2008, reduces the clawback of the National Child Benefit
Supplement (NCBS) but doesn't end it. As of July, 2008, the NCBS will no longer be deducted from
the monthly cheques of families on Ontario Works (OW) or the Ontario Disability Support
Program (ODSP)." See Hands Off, supra note 129.
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31 2
bolstering the family is the goal (e.g., health care and education).
Recent feminist literature speaks of the Keynesian welfare state as if the
public realm really supplanted the private-when all it ever did at best
was to shore it up.
While the definition of spouse has expanded to include same-sex
relationships, the nuclear form of the family has retained its
hegemony.'33 Through its emphasis on marriage and its asserted
importance to the children of same-sex couples, the same-sex marriage
campaign has in fact contributed to the further marginalization of single
mother families.'34 Thus, what we are seeing is a reformation of the
privatization principle, which is always patriarchal. We do not share the
view that there is a new gender order. 135 Rather, we believe there is a
reformed gender order in which patriarchal norms and values remain
unchanged (even if modified, as attested by the successful same-sex
marriage campaign in Canada).
Legislation that was gender and sex specific made the
patriarchal basis of the Keynesian form of welfare state transparent.
What was less obvious, but still remained, were longstanding ideas about
individual responsibility. With respect to women, their role as mothers
was explicit. The legislation also entrenched the individual responsibility
of mothers to supplement their benefits (see the first Ontario Mothers'
Allowance Act); and later, under Keynesianism, the express principle
was that mothers' work was women's work, and that the payment of the
allowance itself was for a form of motherwork available only to certain
mothers. With gender neutral legislation, the individual responsibility of
everyone, including mothers, to become engaged in wage labour, is
articulated, while the individual responsibility for domestic labour
becomes less visible and less articulated. Women's unpaid labour is
increasing. This is especially the case since the words "health care" have
been redefined to include only urgent care, early discharges from
hospitals, and the increasing use of homecare for the sick and the elderly.

2

'
'

33

See McIntosh, supra note 25.
Gavigan, "Legal Forms," supra note 108.

See also, Shelley A.M. Gavigan, "Equal Families, Equal Parents, Equal Spouses, Equal
Marriage: The Case of the Missing Patriarch" (2006) 33 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 219.
'3

' See Janine Brodie, Politics on the Margins. Restructuringand the Canadian Women's
Movement(Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1995).
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As Cossman has argued, there could be more of a discursive
shift-and on this we might agree; however, we need to interrogate the
discursive shift within the material context. In our view, within the
Keynesian welfare state there was a discourse of helping the poor that
translated into alleviating (but not supplanting) the historical
expectation that people are responsible for their own poverty and that it
is up to them to seek assistance from their own family, friends, and
community before they go to the state.
The new rhetoric and policies of privatization are linked to the
notion of reduced public spending. Yet, clamping down on welfare fraud
does not save the state any money since there is an increase in stateinitiated intervention and state expenditure. What has shifted is the
extent of privatization-but that is different from saying that
privatization is completely new. There is a reorganization and
retrenchment of the state, a renegotiating of the public/private divide,
and a redefinition not simply of where the line is drawn, but also of what
"content" belongs in each sphere.
Despite the important insights of feminist family law scholars
who are analyzing forms of privatization in family and social welfare
law,"' it appears that important sites of privatization remain un- or
under-theorized.137 In particular, compelling illustrations of privatization
in family law may be seen in the context of the increasingly permissive
approach to "private ordering" in family law,- such as mediation and
arbitration. This also includes approval at the highest level of the
Canadian judiciary permitting the "contracting out" of family law and
holding spouses to their "freely contracted bargains." In many ways, the
emerging dominant discourse in family law (but not welfare law) is
"freedom of contract"-the sine qua non of the private.
V.

WELFARE LAW REFORM, THEN AND NOW: SOME
CONCLUSIONS

In this article, we have analyzed two important waves of welfare
law reform and the implications thereof for poor lone mothers and their

136

Susan B. Boyd, Child Custody, Law, and Women's Work (Toronto: Oxford University

Press, 2003) at 215-19; Cossman, supra note 5.
"' See especially Miglin v. Miglin, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303; Hartshorne v. Hartshorne(2004),
236 D.L.R. (4th) 193.
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children. We do not suggest that we have covered the entire history of
the construction and regulation of poor mothers and their relationship
to forms of social assistance-from mothers' allowances, to family
benefits, to new notions of workfare: that larger project awaits us on
another day. However, our analysis here leads us to the conclusion that
the continuities, as well as the discontinuities, between "then" and
"now" need to be acknowledged and understood.
There are some striking continuities or similarities between the
first wave of mothers' allowances and the neo-liberal reforms of the
1990s. Both periods were ones of structural change and reformation of
the public and the private (state/market/family). Both periods were
marked by concern about a "crisis" of the (nuclear) family. Both periods
saw the enactment of welfare legislation that assumed the participation
of (female) beneficiaries in paid labour, in conjunction with the
implementation of other legislation (child support guidelines,
maintenance acts) aimed at enforcing individual male responsibility to
provide for dependent women and children. Both periods saw feminists
push for welfare reforms that had mixed impact. While these reforms
challenged the patriarchal status quo and (re)formed the gender order,
feminists were ultimately unable to control the content, form, and
administration of the legislation.
However, we have also identified important differences and
discontinuities in the periods we have examined. The reformation of the
public and private produced different forms of liberal state (both preand post-Keynesian), and of welfare law and policy. The earlier "crisis"
of the family revolved around concern about "white" Canada,
specifically a concern about bolstering the nuclear family (especially in
the wake of the First World War and the influenza epidemic). The late
twentieth-century "crisis" of the family reflected anxiety about perceived
threats to the traditional (white) nuclear family posed by the
proliferation of opposite and same-sex common law relationships and
more recently by the legalization of same-sex marriage.
In the early twentieth century, welfare reforms (such as mothers'
allowances and pensions) prioritized women's unpaid labour over their
paid labour. The basis of women's citizenship thus derived from their
status as mothers. In the late twentieth century, welfare reforms
prioritized paid labour and assumed the performance of unpaid labour.
Women and mothers disappeared and were replaced by the genderneutral worker whose basis of citizenship is participation in paid
employment.
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In the pre-Keynesian state, welfare legislation and policy were
premised on the family wage-a sexual division of labour in which the
male is the breadwinner and the female is the homemaker. This model
of social and familial relations constructed women as the "natural"
economic dependants of men. Mothers/wives were conceptualized and
regulated primarily in terms of their relationships to the (private) family
and not their relationship to the (public) market. The reverse was true
for fathers/husbands. This commitmen t to a family wage rarely
translated into a living wage for members of low income households,
and consigned women to poverty, unemployment, or socially invisible
forms of (under)employment. 3
For single mothers, the implications of this emphasis on the
(dependant) homemaker role were expressed and experienced through
(1) legislation and welfare policies that required them to pursue the
(putative) fathers of their children for support; and (2) after the First
World War, the limited government provision of allowances to destitute,
widowed, and later to abandoned mothers in recognition solely of their
role in the social reproduction of future citizens, and not as women per
se. This form of state financial assistance was means-tested, based on
the "principle of less eligibility," contingent on closely scrutinized "fit
and proper" behaviour, and enforced, if need be, through
disqualification and/or criminalization. Moreover, the provision of such
assistance was based on the express policy that it was temporary, as well
as supplementary to home-based earnings, to help worthy single
mothers until they were able to (re)marry.
The welfare legislation and policy of the neo-liberal state are
premised on the formal equality and gender neutrality of the freely
choosing, self-reliant actor (and more substantively worthy and equal
taxpayer). Women are now expected to be employed.. The
"feminization" of paid labour, together with the restructuring of the
welfare state, has "equalized" the experience of (under)employment for
many people, forcing both men and women to accept "bad" jobs, and
making it imperative that both spouses in a family earn money in one
way or another. Thus, like men and fathers, women and mothers are
conceptualized and regulated primarily in terms of their relationship to
'-8 Baillargeon, supra note 47; Boris & Kleinberg, supra note 47; Mink, supra note 47; Parr,
supra note 47; Sangster, supra note 47.
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the labour market. Now women's relationship to the (private) family is
taken for granted and rendered as invisible as their relationship to
employment used to be.
A major implication of recent welfare reforms is that single
parents (mothers) have disappeared as a category of social assistance
recipient. While there is continuing emphasis on mothers pursuing the
putative fathers of their children for support under state legislation and
policies, the formal rationale is couched in a different form of discourse.
These mothers now have the role of the independent, self-sufficient,
"choosing" market citizen who is responsible for her bad choice of
husband/father. Therefore, rather than looking to the state for support,
they are required to take advantage of welfare-to-work programmes that
will prepare them for paid employment and end their "dependency" on
the state. The importance of social reproduction in raising and caring for
their children has vanished as a social good. State financial assistance is
stringently means-tested, based on even narrower "principles of less
eligibility," contingent on moral behaviour (now conceptualized as
industrious and asexual), and increasingly time-restricted and enforced, if
need be, through disqualification and/or criminalization. State financial
assistance is no longer formally conceptualized as welfare or assistance; its
provision is still temporary, but is now designed solely to move
unemployed workers into the labour market.
The erasure of sole support parents, initially penciled into
Canadian welfare law only as mothers, has been completed. Their needs
as mothers with responsibility for the care and upbringing of children
have become as anachronistic as the very notion of social welfare itself.
The challenge for those who remain committed to the principle of
substantive equality and to the possibility of progressive social change is
to continue to work to create social conditions and relations in which
the poverty of single mothers and their children is neither inevitable nor
denied. Until then, mothers need not apply.

